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THE AESTHETIC WRITINGS OF SCHILLER
BY BIRGER

WHEN

R.

IIEADSTROM

Schiller turned to Kant, he

hoped

to find in the

Kantian

philosophy an escape from the conflict between the principles of

and his creative impulses, to which his early philosophic studies
had given rise, and to regain, as well, his inner life and artistic
spontaneity which they had destroyed. Exactly how he felt about
the matter can be seen from a letter to Korner, in which he sa}-s
"I am full of eagerness for some poetic task and particularly my
pen is itching to be at 'W'allenstein." Really it is only in art itself
In theorizing I have to plague myself all
that I feel my strength.
There I am only a dilettante. Hut it
the while about principles.
is precisely for the sake of artistic creation that I wish to philosophize.
Criticism must repair the damage it has done me.
And it
has done me great damage indeed; for I miss in myself these many
years that boldness, that living fire, that was mine before I knew
Xow I see myself in the act of creating and fashioning; I
a rule.
observe the play of inspiration, and m\' imagination works less
freely, since it is conscious of being watched.
But if I once reach
the point where artistic procedure becomes natural, like education
for the well-nurtured man, then my fancy will get back its old freedom, and know no bounds but those of its own making." In short,
what he sought, and did find, was a poetical inodus vivendi between
natural impulse and artistic rule.
It was at the academy at Stuttgart that Schiller obtained, from
the "Institutes" of Ferguson, his first ideas on aesthetic philosophy.
For Ferguson, in whom there was no distinction between the moral
and aesthetic domain, all truth is beauty, "the most natural beauty
in the world being honesty and moral truth." Also, for him, perfection was made to depend on harmony and proportion moral beauty
upon the harmony of the individual soul wdth the general scheme

art

;
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wrong

was equally looked upon as imperfectoward the general harmon\-, meant,
necessarily, happiness.
Such were the thoughts that defined Schiller's early philosophic writings, as the letters of Julius and Raphael,
and the second book of The Ghostseer. But towards the end of his
first year at \\'eimar, a new field of exploration was opened to him.
Vov the author of The Gods of Greece and The Artists as one
of the essential factors in human perfectibility, had assumed such
vast proportions of importance that he felt it of the gravest concern to understand it, this feeling, in fact, largely influencing him
to utilize the Danish pension to a th(3rough stud\' of the Kantian

of things

;

while

And

tion.

action

virtue, inclining

aesthetics.

A

course of lectures on the theor\- of traged\' was the

initial

and though the\' were never published
their general import is contained in the two essays, "On the Rational
Basis of Pleasure in Tragic Themes," and "( )n the Tragic Art."
Tn the former, Schiller began b\' first contending that art has no
higher aim than the giving of pleasure, sa\ing that its aim is not
morality but "free pleasvn-e," by "free" meaning subject to no law
but its own. and that if morality becomes its final aim it ceases to
be "free." He then passed on to a discussion of the problem of our
result of this interest in art,

To

experiencing pleasure in painful representations.
sure descends from
ity

to be happ\',

human

suffering

Since, howe\er,

recognizes in

it

we

a higher

must be

a

;

"adaptation" and therefore knowing
in

our

own

pain.

which

this

it

From which

arrived at the conclusion that the effect of tragedy
in

plea-

are incited to activity by this pain, reason

good for us we take pleasure

upon the proportion

all

(the qual-

and as man meant
"maladaption" which affects

of adaptability to the furtherance of an end)

pain.

him,

the ])erception of Zzwckiuliscii/keit

is

is

he

dependent

higher sense of adaptation

is

present.

The

gist

of this argument

is

that aesthetic

judgments are con-

sidered to be dependent uj^on concepts of the mind, the reason, with
its

various abstractions, being viewed as the prior and dominating

factor.

Tn the other of the two essays

may

we

find, nevertheless, that

and of itself; and
which indicate that Schiller
did not neglect the non-rational element in the pleasure afforded by

emotional excitement

though numerous

give pleasure

illustrations are given

in

THE

he attached

traged}', \et

we

AESTTII-.TIC

little

WRITI
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importance to

it

for he claimed ihat

are ac(|uainted with onl\- two sources of pleasure, the satisfac-

tion of the inclination for happiness

After

laws.

strug-j^lin^-

and the fulhllment of moral

with such hazy abstractions, he hnally

tempted a practical discussion of tragedy graduall\-

coming

at-

to regard

aim as being the excitation of "s\mpathy."
B\- the \'ear 1793. Schiller had become familiar whh aesthetic
speculations and moreover had found what he considered as a weak
point in the S}-stem of Kant, that if it were futile to try to establish
an objective criterion of beauty all aesthetic judgments must necessa most undesirable concluarilv be reduced to a matter of taste,
sion.
To Kant, the aesthetic faculty came imder the jurisdiction of
its

sole

—

the ''judgment,'" a judgment, according to him. being teleologic

implying a pre-existing notion to which the objectixe

conform, aesthetic

if

we have an

the agreeable, the beautiful

that

is

llowexer. this

categor\' of ([ualitw for

interest in the

good and

which i)leases us without a[)])ealis merely its character under the

under that of

under that of relation

sure, while

if

expected to

the object gixes rise directl\- to pleasure or

pain; in other words, though

ing to an\- interest,

is

it

is

(|uantit\-

a

it

is

uni\ersal

form of adaptation.

•j)lea-

And,

under modalit}' it is "necessary" because of the sensus
communis of mankind, that is. it is determined rather l)\- their
tinallv,

agreement

in taste

than

b\- an\"

objective criterion.

To him,
Aesthetics, then, for Kant was a subjecti\e matter.
was not so much as what made objects beautiful, but rather as
to how we "judge" them to be beautiful: in short, the essence of
beauty was to please without reference to an\- intellectual conce])t
such as objective attributes of form, proportion, harmon_\-, etc. The
fault with this is that a judgment which has no connection with
it

the intellect

is

not a judgment but a feeling, but despite this he had,

at least, the merit of distincth'

more

showing the

necessit}- of distinguish-

between the beautiful and the good and agreeable.
Furthermore, though insisting that beaut}' could not depend upon a
ing

clearl_\-

notwithstanding

its

being a concept of the mind, as a form of beauty, meeting this

in-

mental

concept,

he recognized

"adaptation,"

making a distinction between free beautx'
and adherent beauty (pulchritudo adhaerens).

consistency, however, by
(

pulchritudo vaga

And,

lasth",

)

though he held that the highest use of beaut\-

is

to
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symbolize moral truth, he claimed,

was impossible

in a

at the

moral action since

same

it

time, that pure beauty

does not please in and of

itself.

With such
letter to the

a philosophy, Schiller could not be satisfied.

1793, he clearly expressed his attitude by sa}ing in part:

consider

how

it

"When

and the great

closely our feeling for the beautiful

connected with the noblest part of our being,

me

In a

Prince of Augustenburg, dated the 9th of February,
I

is

impossible for

is

to regard this feeling as a mere subjective play of the emotional

none but empirical rul'es. It seems to me that
beauty too. as well as truth and right, must rest upon eternal foundations, and that the original laws of the reason must also be the laws
of taste. It is true that the circumstance of our feeling beauty and
not cognizing it seems to cut off all hoi)e of our finding a universal
law for it, because every judgment emanating from this source is a
judgment of experience. As a rule people accept an explanation of
faculty, capable of

beauty onlv becatise
dict of

feeling,

it

harmonizes

whereas,

if

in particular cases

cognition of beauty from principles,
feeling because

it

we

should trust the verdict of

coincides with our explanation of the beautiful.

Instead of testing and correcting our feelings
ciples,

we

with the ver-

there were really such a thing as the

test aesthetic principles

In a series of letters to Korner, Schiller
the problem which

b\'

means of

prin-

by our feelings."

Kant had regarded

now

set

about to solve

as impossible of solution.

Although he agreed with the latter's view that beauty cannot depend
upon a mental concept,^ the feeling of pleasure is the prior fact,
he could not. at the same time, shake ofif the conviction that beauty
must in some way fall under the laws of reason. He escaped from
this difficulty, however, by removing the aesthetic faculty from the
jurisdiction of Kant's "judgment" and giving it to the "practical
reason." his argument being that the practical reason must have
freedom just as well as the "pure reason" rationality, for freedom
is the form instinctively applied by the practical reason upon the
presentation of an object, and is satisfied when, and only when, the
object is free and autonomous. Furthermore, practical reason, upon
the presentation of an object, can discard all concepts of the pure
reason and if then the object appears free, autonomous, it is satisfied, the effect thus produced is pleasurable and we call it beauty.

—

THE

HowcAei", as Schiller ])ointed out.
for the object

is
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it

is

not free as freedom

all

a c[uestion

is onl}-

of appearance

possible in the super-

sensual world, yet the practical reason imputes this freedom to

Hence he arrived
appearance

(

to

his

solution that

Freheit in der Erscheinung

This doctrine Schiller applied,
to
to

beaut\'

is

freedom

in

it.

the

).

in a letter

of February 23. 1793.

an exposition of the relation between nature and
the theory, the problem of an artist is to convey,

According

art.

in the

represen-

which he can only
own
law
hv
making
it
appear
follow
its
and
which it must
to
do
while
seemingly
free,
this
law
the
basis
of our imhave and obey
pression of freedom being that revealed b}' technique.
Following
Kant's saying that nature is beautiful when it looks like art. and
art beautiful when it looks like nature, Schiller employed a large
tation of the object, the suggestion of freedom,
:

(

)

number of

illustrations in support of his theory, tinally

concluding

by saying: "Therefore the empire of taste is the empire of freedom
the beautiful world of sense being the happiest symbol of what the

:

moral world should
a happy citizen

who

be,

and e\ery beautiful object about
He free like me."

me

being

calls out:

was aware though

was after
which he promised to meet,
but unfortunate!}- his aesthetic correspondence with Korner was not
continued. In 'Sla.y and June of the same }ear, that is, 1793. he was
led to test his theory of beaut\- in the human form, in an essay on
Winsomeness and Dignity, by Kant's dictum that there is no pure
beauty to the human form because the human form expresses the
moral dignity of human nature which is but an idea of the reason.
Schiller

all

an idea of the reason, a

As an

that this criterion of beauty

difficulty

illustration of his point, he

made

use of the girdle of A'enus,

though \'enus was pure beauty on coming from the hand
of nature, her girdle made her "winsome;" winsomeness being then
something distinct from beauty, something transferable, movable;
sa_\ing that

defined as beaut}- of motion, as the element of beautv which

possessed by nature but which

is

not

produced b}' the object. Schiller
then went on to make a distinction between architectonic and technical beaut}-, the former being a beautiful presentation of the aims
of nature, while the latter refers onl}- to the aims themselves. And
it is the former with which the aesthetic facult}' is concerned, for
in the

is

contemplation of an object

it

is

alone affected

b}- its

appear-
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ance which

purpose or adaptation, though
imputed to it by the reason. In a word,
when the object is a human form this imputed freedom, by which
it appears to assert its own autonomous personahty, and which is
furthermore added to the beauty which nature creates by the lawgoverned adaptation of means to an end, is winsomeness.
at the

it

isolates irrespective of

same time freedom

is

Fully satisfied that beauty consists of the two elements, sensuous
pleasure, and rational gratification, caused by personality, and the

adaptation to an end, Schiller next considered the questions of moral

beauty and ideal of character.

Of

Kant's insistence upon the cate-

man, he claimed,
above all else must be free, the slavery of duty being to him no
Inclination to duty is, howbetter than any other kind of slavery.
ever, virtue, the ideal being found in a perfect state of balance
between the sensuous nature and the rational. And as winsomegorical imperative of duty, he disapproved, for a

ness

is

the expression of a beautiful soul, so he defined "dignitx"

as the expression of a lofty mind,-

— the

expression of that intellec-

freedom which controls the impulses by moral strength, and
manifested in suffering
as winsomeness in behavior
jtdSoc
tual

)

(

(yboq).
Following
in

Schiller next published

this essay,

which was included

a

special

chapter

"On

On

the

the Siihlime,

Pathetic" and

"Scattered Reflections on \'arious Aesthetic Subjects."

"On

Two

other

and the Low," and a
second disquisition "On the Sublime," though written during the
same period were not, however, published until 1801. Like Kant,
he defined the sublime as the impression produced by an object
which excites in man's sensuous nature a feeling of weakness and
dependence, and at the same time in his rational nature a feeling
of freedom and superiorit}'.
He objected though to the former's
terminology, and proposed instead, for Kant's terms of the mathematical and dynamic w'hich he had given to the two kinds of sublime, the names of the theoretical and the practical, by the former
meaning that which tends to overawe the mind, by the latter that
which tends to overawe the feeling. But the most important phase
of the practical sublime is the subject of tragic pathos, and here
Schiller took the view that the final aim of art is the representation

papers

the Artistic

Use of

the Wilgar

of the supersensuous, declaring that the essence of tragic pathos

is
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the representation of moral suiteriority under the strain of sufferinj^.

The

spectacle of suffering"

in itself

is

inherently no aesthetic \alue

:

it

no end, for the sensuous has

the moral resistance alone that

is

is

of anv account, the suffering being needed only to prove the necessIn short, the hero's suff'erings

of resistance.

ity

may

in order that he

must appear

real

receive proper credit for his moral trium])h.

In his discussions on the sublime and the pathetic, Schiller felt
at

man}' times that he was on the point of being carried away into

the region of barren

thought

show

as to

was

it

this

speculation,

and

to

offset

this

necessar\- to j^-esent his ideas in a i)opular
their relation to the practical concerns of

thought that

finally led

him

to

1793, that the political

dream of

human

as well
life.

undertake a series of

Augustenburg. declaring,

to the Prince of

tendency he

form

in

It

letters

a letter of July

13.

the century, of recreating society

had dissoK-ed into thin air for
show himself fit for freedom. Though his
chains mights be removed, he was still a sla\e, a slave to unrul\'
passion, despite what the centur\- had done for the enlightenment
of his mind: and what was needed was evidently rather a discipline

upon

a foundation of ])ure reason,

"man" had

failed to

—

of the feelings.

In 1795, Schiller published, in the Horcii. his "Let-

on Aesthetic Education" of which his letters to the Prince had
formed the basis, and which serve as the most agreeable expression
of his aesthetic ])hilosoph\-. The first ten were devoted to a discusters

sion of the spirit of the age

and

to

demonstrate the

necessity" of

some form of educational process by which mankind could be
pared for the higher state of freeman, the problem being,

in a

])re-

word,

the transformation of the state-ruled-by-force into a state-ruled-by-

To attain this end it was necessar)' that man should
how to o\ercome the despotism of sense, which leads to

reason.

first

learn

sav-

and the supineness of mind, which leads to barbarism, the
savage, Schiller defining, as a man whose feelings control his principles, and a barbarian as a man whose principles destro}' his feelThe man coinnie il faiit must not onl\- establish but preserve
ings.
Put
a state of balance between his sensuous and rational natures.
how was this to be done? For neither the state nor philosoph\- could
help him as the former treated him as if he had no reason, the latter
For the poet, his salvation lay, then, only
as if he had no feelings.

ager}-,

in the aesthetic sense, the love of beautv.
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To show how the aesthetic sense could accomphsh this Schiller
had recourse of two ultimate instincts or bents of mankind which
he called the "thing-bent" (Sachtrieb) and the "form-bent" (Formtricb), the problem of culture being to bring them into harmony.
As a means to this latter end, he then made use of the "play-bent"
moment

or "Spieltrieb," his idea being that in the

of aesthetic con-

templation both the sensuous and rational instincts find their reckoning; that

the act of escaping

is.

mental state which

to a

satisfies

from the

thought and feeling

pull of

both without \ielding to either was

analogous to the act of playing, the word meaning, as he employed
it,

a surrender to the illusion of art.

the highest self-realization,

being thus s\mbolic of

Pla}

man becomes

completely

man

only in

pla}'ing.

Schiller then

went on

to say that the natural corrective to the

emotional excess which leads to savagery

Kant
to

is

scJiuiclzcnde Schdnhcit (melting beauty)

mental

the

Schojilie'it

inertness

(energizing

state being recognized

is,

man

Ikit

it

is

;

the sublime),

because of

called

like

while the antidote

barbarism

to

as being neutral as

influencing of the will.

when

which leads

beauty, that

what he

far as

it

this that

is

enerf/ische

the aesthetic

concerns the
it

is

valuable

under the exclusive domination of either
principles or feelings he is in danger of becoming a slave, and must
"In a word." said
be redrawn to the neutral zone of freedom.
Schiller, "there is no other way of making the sensuous man rational
exce[)t b\- first making him aesthetic." The pith of all this is that
sanit\' and refinement being exigencies good art serves to realize
them and in so doing indirectly furthers progress in right living and

moralK'. for

a

is

right thinking, a seemingly small result to

much
ters"

laborious logic-chopping, }et after
is

have been obtained by so
all

the value of the "Let-

not to be found in the logic-chopping nor in "the dreadful

first princijiles, the forest huge of terminology and definiwhere the panting intellect of weaker men wanders as in pathless thickets and at length sinks powerless to the earch, oppressed
with fatigue and suft'ocated with scholastic miasma,"^ but rather in
their wealth of suggestive comment.
In conclusion, we have only to mention his later minor papers
as "On the Necessary Limits of the T.eautiful," in which he took

arrav of
tions

1

Carlyle's Life of Schiller.
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view that the philosopher, aimini? at truth, should not try
fact and logic
to write beautifullv. for being- concerned rather with
mind, just as
the
relaxing
by
truth
the lure of beauty ma> endanger
being
thought
latter
this
morality,
it mav relax the will and endanger
the

carried

still

further in his essays

"On

the

Dangers of Aesthetic Cul-

ture" and "On the floral Benefit of Aesthetic Culture" which are,
however, merelv an extension of ideas contained in the "Letters."

